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STATE v. MANN: JUDICIAL CHOICE OR
JUDICIAL DUTY?*
JUDGE JAMES A. WYNN, JR.**

Judge Thomas Ruffin was ranked by Dean Roscoe Pound as one
the ten greatestjurists in American history, in part due to his use
of the common law as an agent for economic change and for his
influence on the laws of other states. Yet it is his decision as a
new judge, in State v. Mann, that remains his best known, both
for its impact on the law of slavery at the time and its cold
treatment of the slave as mere property with "no will of his own"
and "no appealfrom his master" to the courts. At the time of the
Mann decision, North Carolina precedent provided grounds to
disclaim a master's absolute authority over his slave. But in
Mann, Judge Ruffin made the judicial choice to preserve the
relational status quo between master and slave rather than
recognize slaves as sentient beings entitled to rights afforded by
the rule of law. This Essay analyzes the Mann decision and
proposes a dissenting opinion to the reasoningand result reached
by Judge Ruffin.
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INTRODUCTION

With the benefit of history and hindsight-not to mention
positive social change and more enlightened thinking-we all can
agree now that the result reached by Judge Ruffin in State v. Mann' is
Copyright © 2009 by Judge James A. Wynn, Jr.
Former Justice, Supreme Court of North Carolina, and Chair of the Judicial
Division of the American Bar Association; currently, Senior Associate Judge, North
Carolina Court of Appeals. I am grateful for the research and editorial contributions of
my law clerks, Amanda Lacoff, Kimalee Cottrell-Dickerson, and Charles Hunt.
*

**

I dedicate this Essay to my grandfather, Andrew Jackson Wynn, born into slavery
circa 1862 to his enslaved "Mah," Sadie, a contemporary of Lydia.
1. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829).
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unconscionable. But the question remains as to the extent his legal
reasoning was flawed. Several legal scholars have since posited that
the unrelenting march and progression of the law-the precedents
being set every day by judges in courts around the country-made
slavery, and the position that African American men and women
were mere property rather than sentient beings, increasingly
untenable and unlikely to be sustained. As the law began to hold
slaves responsible for their own actions, be it in criminal cases or in
the context of contributory negligence in railroad accidents,2 the
notion of a slave as a mere piece of property, akin to a farm animal or
plow, was becoming more indefensible as a practical and legal matter.
Nevertheless, rather than using his celebrated legal acumen to
recognize that coming truth, Judge Thomas Ruffin instead clung fast
in State v. Mann to the legal fiction of slaves as insensible property,
unworthy of any sort of protection from their owners regardless of
the form of cruelty or barbarity employed. From the standpoint of
judicial process, was Judge Ruffin truly compelled by the state of the
law and his duty as a judge to reach such an outcome, or was his
holding in State v. Mann the result of his own choices as to which laws
and precedents to follow and how to frame the legal question at issue
in the case?
In this Essay, I give a brief history of Judge Ruffin and his
infamous case, State v. Mann. Then, I discuss and conclude that his
decision was one more of judicial choice than of judicial duty. Finally,
I offer my own dissenting opinion to the Mann opinion.
I. STATE V. MANN

After serving in the North Carolina House of Commons and as a
superior court judge, Thomas Ruffin was named in 1829 by the
General Assembly to serve on the Supreme Court of North Carolina.3

2. See generally Poole v. North Carolina R.R. Co., 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 340 (1861)
(holding that a railroad company was not liable for running over a deaf slave on the
tracks); Herring v. Wilmington & R.R. Co., 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 402 (1849) (holding that a
railroad company was not liable for running over slaves that were sleeping on the railroad
tracks).
3. See Memoranda, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 281, 281 (1829) (noting the election of Thomas
Ruffin, Esq., of Raleigh, during the last session of the General Assembly to fill the
vacancy on the North Carolina Supreme Court left by the death of the first chief justice,
John Louis Taylor). North Carolina Supreme Court judges were not popularly elected
until after the 1868 state constitution was enacted. See N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. IV, § 26
(1868).
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He was elected chief justice by his peers in 1833, 4 serving in that
capacity until 1852, when he left the court before returning for just
one year in 1858.1 Judge Ruffin also had a plantation and slaves in
Alamance County, North Carolina, to which he retired following his
career on the bench.6
In his time on the supreme court, Judge Ruffin authored over
1,300 opinions7 and was ranked by Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe
Pound as one of the ten greatest jurists in American history, in part
due to his use of the common law as an agent for economic change, as
well as for the impact his decisions had on laws in other states,
particularly in the southeastern United States.8
But it is his lone decision as a new supreme court judge, in State
v. Mann, that remains his most controversial and perhaps best-known
opinion, both for its impact on the law of slavery at the time and its
cold treatment of the slave as mere property with "no will of his own"
and "no appeal from his master" to the courts.9 That opinion, one of
his first for the court, written four years before his election as chief
justice, reversed the trial court-and went against the arguments
made by the State of North Carolina through the Attorney Generalto hold that "[t]he power of the master must be absolute to render the
submission of the slave perfect" such that an owner is not

4. Chief Justice Leonard Henderson died in 1833 and was replaced by William
Gaston, a lawyer and experienced politician credited, along with Thomas Ruffin, with
making the Supreme Court of North Carolina one of the strongest in the country. See
Martin H. Brinkley, Supreme Court of North Carolina: A Brief History,
http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/copyright/sc/facts.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2009). John
Hall was replaced after his death in 1832 by Joseph J. Daniel, who, incidentally, was the
trial judge in State v. Mann. See Walter Clark, A History of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina,177 N.C. 617, 622 (1919).
5. See NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT 1585-1974:
A NARRATIVE AND
STATISTICAL HISTORY 360-61 (John L. Cheney, Jr. ed., 1975) (noting that Ruffin did not

return to the court as chief justice).
6. Judge Ruffin sold his plantation after the Civil War, finding that he could not
maintain it profitably after the emancipation of African Americans. See William A.
Graham, A Memorial Oration, in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN 30 (J.G. de Roulbac

Hamilton ed., 1918) (lauding Ruffin's operation of his plantation "until the year 1866,
when the results of the war deprived him of laborers, and he sold the estate and removed
again to Hillsborough"); see also Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Edward Conigland (July 2,
1866), in 4 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN 62 (J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton ed., 1920)

(explaining to Edward Conigland, member of the North Carolina constitutional
convention of 1865, that, "in the altered condition of the Country, I could not with any
profit of satisfaction, carry on a Plantation").
7. A Westlaw search conducted on November 21, 2008, under search criteria
"ju(ruffin) & da(bef 1860)" returned 1,442 documents.
8. See Brinkley, supra note 4.
9. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266-67 (1829).
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"answerable criminaliter for a battery upon his own slave, or other
exercise of authority or force not forbidden by statute."1
State v. Mann came before the Supreme Court of North
Carolina as an appeal by the defendant from his conviction for assault
and battery upon a slave.11 At trial, evidence showed that the
defendant, John Mann, had hired Lydia, a slave owned by Elizabeth
Jones, for one year.12 During that year, Lydia had committed some
offense against the defendant. 3 When Mann "undertook to chastise
her," Lydia ran away, at which point he called to her to stop and then
shot and wounded her when she did not do so.14 The trial court
instructed the jury that, if they believed the punishment was "cruel
and unwarrantable," and "disproportionate to the offen[s]e
committed by the slave," they should return a guilty verdict. 5
Defendant then appealed his conviction to the16supreme court, led at
that time by Chief Justice Leonard Henderson.
According to the text of the opinion, Judge Ruffin's hands were
tied: regardless of "the feelings of the man[,] ...the duty of the

magistrate" meant that he could not "avoid any responsibility which
the laws impose."'" Judge Ruffin thus recognized that the law
governing a master's actions toward his own slaves was still evolving,
noting the absence of a statutory bar to forceful or violent behavior
by a master. 8 Nevertheless, as a supreme court judge who was
considered later in his tenure to have "transformed the common law
of North Carolina into an instrument of economic change,"' 9 Judge
Ruffin showed a remarkable reluctance in State v. Mann to utilize the
common law to move society forward in its attitude toward the
treatment of slaves.
Indeed, while Judge Ruffin observed "[t]hat there may be
particular instances of cruelty and deliberate barbarity where, in
conscience, the law might properly interfere," he then stepped back
10. Id. at 265-66.
11. Id. at 263.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Brinkley, supra note 4.
16. At that point, the Supreme Court of North Carolina had only three judges in total.
Aside from then-Judge Ruffin, Chief Justice Henderson and Judge John Hall-two of the
original members of the court-were serving in 1829. See Walter Clark, A History of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina,177 N.C. 617, 620-22 (1919).
17. Mann, 13 N.C.(2 Dev.) at 264.
18. See id. at 268 ("[I]t will be the imperative duty ... except where the exercise of it
is forbidden by statute.").
19. See Brinkley, supranote 4.
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from moving the court in that direction, cautioning that "we are
forbidden to enter upon a train of general reasoning on the subject.
We cannot allow the right of the master to be brought into discussion
in the courts of justice. 2 ° Yet, in a decision six years before Mann,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Hale2 1 upheld battery
by a stranger against a slave as an indictable offense.22 The Hale
court employed language that Judge Ruffin could have seized upon to
reach a different outcome in Mann, by focusing on the behavior of
the perpetrator, rather than the identity of the victim:
The common law has often been called into efficient operation
for the punishment of public cruelty inflicted upon animals for
needless and wanton barbarity exercised even by masters upon
their slaves, and for various violations of decency, morals, and
comfort. Reason and analogy seem to require that a human
being, although the subject of property, should be so far
protected as the public might be injured through him.23
Despite the prerogative of the courts to shape the common law
of a young nation, Judge Ruffin wrote that, "[t]he Court, therefore,
disclaims the power of changing the relation [of slavery] in which
these parts of our people stand to each other. '24 Rather, North
Carolina and the country had to wait "until the disparity in numbers
between the whites and blacks shall have rendered the latter in no
degree dangerous to the former," which would be the result of
increasing statutory protections, "the private interest of the owner,
the benevolences towards each other, seated in the hearts of those
who have been born and bred together, the frowns and deep
execrations of the community upon the barbarian who is guilty of
excessive and brutal cruelty to his unprotected slave. '25 According to
Judge Ruffin,
[t]his result, greatly to be desired, may be much more rationally
expected from [those events] than from any rash expositions of
abstract truths by a judiciary tainted with a false and fanatical
philanthropy, seeking to redress an acknowledged evil by
26
means still more wicked and appalling than even that evil.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 267.
9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582 (1823).
Id. at 586.
Id. at 585.
Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 267.
Id. at 267-68.
Id. at 268.
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From the plain language employed by Judge Ruffin in the
opinion, he was tormented both by having to consider the question
and deciding it the way he did. Even so, he repeatedly asserted that
such an outcome was impossible to avoid given the state of the law:
[T]he Court is compelled to declare that while slavery exists
amongst us in its present state, or until it shall seem fit to the
legislature to interpose express enactments to the contrary, it
will be the imperative duty of the Judges to recognize the full
dominion of the owner over the slave, except where the
exercise of it is forbidden by statute.27
Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the language from Hale, Judge
Ruffin did have a basis in the law to uphold John Mann's conviction
for battery against Lydia, a slave he had hired. In the Appendix to
this Essay, I offer an example of how a judge with a different judicial
philosophy might have employed the precedent of State v. Hale-and
thus, the common law existing at the time in North Carolina,
including the ongoing existence of slavery as an institution-to
dissent from the result Judge Ruffin claims he was "compelled" to
reach in Mann.2 8

II.

JUDICIAL CHOICE

Judge Ruffin's words in State v. Mann make clear that he was
aware of the eroding support in legal precedents for the treatment of
slaves as mere property.2 9 But arguably, Judge Ruffin made the
judicial choice to arrest that erosion, at least for a time. He reasserted
that "[t]he end is the profit of the master, his security and the public
safety," which can be accomplished only through the absolute power
of the master and the perfect submission of the slave.3" Thus, Judge

27. Id.
28. See infra Appendix; accord Eric L. Muller, Judging Thomas Ruffin and the
Hindsight Defense, 87 N.C. L. REV. 757, 772-73 (2009); Sally Greene, State v. Mann
Exhumed, 87 N.C. L. REV. 701, 734-35 (2009).
29. See, e.g., Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 268 ("[Tlhe Court is compelled to declare that
while slavery exists amongst us in its present state, or until it shall seem fit to the
legislature to interpose express enactments to the contrary, it will be the imperative duty
of the judges to recognize the full dominion of the owner over the slave, except where the
exercise of it is forbidden by statute."). One such statutory prohibition limiting the
owner's "full dominion" over the slave was enacted twelve years before Mann and
expressly provided that the killing of a slave by any person was a homicide, as at common
law. 1817 N.C. Sess. Laws 1407.
30. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 266 ("This discipline belongs to the state of slavery.
They cannot be disunited without abrogating at once the rights of the master and
absolving the slave from his subjection.").
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Ruffin recognized and directly confronted the judicial choice between
upholding the legality of slavery as an institution on the one hand,3 1
and the recognition that slaves were, in fact, sentient beings and
therefore fundamentally different from other property, on the other.
This difference would ultimately be exposed through cases like Hale
and Mann. The prerogative of Judge Ruffin was to couch the
outcome in Mann as a virtual fait accompli-that if slavery exists as
an institution, then Mann cannot be criminally liable for his battery
against Lydia. In doing so, Judge Ruffin chose not to consider that
the classification of slaves as insentient property was inconsistent with
the laws and legal system of the United States.
Stated simply, Judge Ruffin made a deliberate choice in State v.
Mann to continue to operate under the assumption that a slave was
only a piece of property without a conscious presence as a human
being, notwithstanding his own understanding of the fact that the
institution's necessary conception of slaves as mere property was
ultimately a legal fiction.32 Judge Ruffin chose to focus on the trees
rather than to see the forest-yet, he did so in the name of preserving
31. Id. at 265 ("The established habits and uniform practice of the country ... is the
best evidence of the portion of power deemed by the whole community requisite to the
preservation of the master's dominion.").
32. Prior to Mann, several jurisdictions recognized slaves as "persons" entitled to the
protection of their criminal statutes and appropriate food, shelter, and clothing from their
owners. See generally United States v. Brockett, 24 F. Cas. 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1823) (No.
14,651) (holding that a slave owner's vicious and unjustified assault on his slave was an
indictable offense); State v. Bowen, 14 S.C.L. (3 Strob.) 573 (1849) (holding that a 1740
Act imposing criminal fines upon slave owners neglecting to provide sufficient food to
their slaves was constitutional). See also State v. Scott, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 24, 24 (1820)
(explaining that the Act of 1817 "gives to a slave the character of a human being, and
places him within the peace of the State, so far as regards his life").
After the Civil War, Ruffin himself advocated for the inclusion of African
Americans as "persons" within the meaning of North Carolina's constitution, worthy of
consideration for purposes of the number of representatives each county would have in
the General Assembly. See Letter from Thomas Ruffin to Edward Conigland, supra note
6, at 64. After posing the question of why white women and children, though not eligible
as representatives or delegates, should be counted for purposes of representation but free
African Americans should not, Judge Ruffin answered:
The answer is plain, that, though non-voters, they are as much bound by the laws
that may be made and therefore, as much interested in them as the white men,
who did vote for the delegates; and therefore the delegates ought to be men, who
are their neighbors, know their wants and condition and sympathise with them
both in their wants and wishes .... My objection is, that black free persons were
not also included-not as voters, but as fixing the representation in point of
numbers. Every reason for including white women and infants applies with equal
force to the blacks, and some of them with greater force.
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the forest at large. Ruffin sacrificed loftier notions of justice in favor
of a decision that looked past its immediate outcome and saw the
consequences for the institution of slavery had the court reached a
different result. In Mann, Judge Ruffin expressed his reluctance to
issue a ruling that would be inconsistent with statutory law and noted
that, even "[i]f we thought differently [about slavery,] we could not
set our notions in array against the judgment of everybody else, and
say that this or that authority may be safely lopped off."33

He

declaimed the authority of a court in such matters. Yet, the label of
judicial conservatism is one he clearly discarded later in his tenure as
chief justice, when he used the power of the judiciary to strengthen
the common law as an agent for economic change.34 Thus, while he
embraced the use of the common law to effectuate economic change,
when confronted with issues involving social norms to which he was
an active participant as a slave owner, he chose to avoid common law

principles that would go against those norms.
As shown by his opinions employing the common law to bring
about economic change, the common law afforded Judge Ruffin the
flexibility to reach a different outcome. Particularly, he could have
focused on the role of the courts and the common law in criminalizing

certain violent or barbaric behavior, regardless of the identity of the
victim involved. By emphasizing social norms for behavior, as Chief
Justice Taylor did in State v. Hale, Judge Ruffin could have defined
John Mann's battery against Lydia as one of the "particular instances

of cruelty and deliberate barbarity where, in conscience, the law
might properly interfere."35

33. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 265.
34. See Arrington v. Wilmington & W.R. Co., 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 68,68 (1858); Gordon
v. Price, 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 277, 277 (1849); accord Graham, supra note 6, at 28 ("[Judge
Ruffin's] familiar knowledge of banking and mercantile transactions and skilfulness [sic] in
accounts, gave him a conceded eminence in the innumerable causes involving inquiries of
this nature."). Before joining the Supreme Court of North Carolina, Judge Ruffin was
recruited in 1828 to serve as President of the State Bank of North Carolina, a time when
its charter was in jeopardy. Judge Ruffin is reputed to have used his "true talent for
finance" to redeem the Bank and lead it out of debt by the end of its charter. Id. at 24.
35. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 267. After becoming chief justice, Ruffin himself
recognized that "the master's authority is not altogether unlimited. He must not kill.
There is, at the least, this restriction upon his power: he must stop short of taking life."
State v. Hoover, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 365, 365 (1839). In that opinion, Chief
Justice Ruffin stated:
The acts imputed to this unhappy man do not belong to a state of civilization.
They are barbarities which could only be prompted by a heart in which every
humane feeling had long been stifled .... Such acts cannot be fairly attributed to
an intention to correct or to chastise. They cannot, therefore, have allowance, as
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Interestingly, five years after the decision in Mann, in State v.
Negro Will,36 Judge Gaston authored an opinion in which then-Chief
Justice Ruffin concurred, that recognized a slave's right-as a human
being fighting for survival-to resist his owner's attempt to kill him
even if that struggle led to the master's own death.37 That slave was
convicted of manslaughter, rather than murder, because "[tihe
prisoner is a human being, degraded indeed by slavery, but yet having
organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions, like our own."38
Further, "[t]he unfortunate man slain was for the time, indeed, his
master, yet this dominion was not like that of a sovereign who can do
no wrong."39 Most significantly, the slave in that case killed his
master after a struggle that began when the slave had run from the
master, seeking to escape punishment, and the master had shot him in
the back-just as in Mann.
Likewise, in State v. Hoover,4" another five years later, Chief
Justice Ruffin himself authored an opinion which affirmed the
conviction of a master for the murder of his slave following
"[p]unishment thus immoderate and unreasonable in the measure ...
[that] loses all character of correction in foro domestico, and denotes
plainly that the prisoner must have contemplated the fatal
termination, which was the natural consequence of such barbarous
cruelties."4 1 Thus, nearly ten years after Mann, Chief Justice Ruffin
engaged in exactly the kind of case-by-case factual determination that
he claimed in Mann must be avoided.
Had Judge Ruffin been willing to challenge the underlying
assumption of the legality of slavery or even to consider its internal
inconsistencies, perhaps he would have authored an opinion that
moved society at least one small step forward in its treatment of
slaves:

being the exercise of an authority conferred by the law for the purposes of the
correction of the slave, or of keeping the slave in due subjection.
Id. at 368-69. Several years later, further eroding the Mann holding, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina concluded that "an assault made by a white man upon a slave which
endangers his life or threatens great bodily harm, will amount to a legal provocation."
State v. Cesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 391, 408 (1849). However, Chief Justice Ruffin dissented
from that opinion. Id.
36. 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 121 (1834).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 172.
39. Id.
40. 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 500 (1839).
41. Id. at 504-05.

1000
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A more correct imagination of the inner life of black people,
living in an insultingly racist regime, might not at once have
brought about much change; evil can remain evil, even when it
can no longer say with a straight face that it knows not what it
does. But it is at least possible that a shift toward humaneness
might have started sooner had the humane imagination sooner
been put to work on this problem in more minds.
At a time when the supreme court actively engaged in creating
the common law, it appears rhetorical to ask whether Judge Ruffin
could have used the court's constitutional role to interpret the law as
a tool to move society forward in its treatment of minorities and other
vulnerable groups. Notably, Judge Ruffin "cited no legal authority
for [his] proposition; his holding was based on [his perceived] realities
of the master-slave relation that made it imperative that the master
have this unlimited power,"43 suggesting that he just as easily could
have reached a different outcome had he chosen to employ different
reasoning." As noted by Justice Benjamin Cardozo, "when the social
needs demand one settlement rather than another, there are times
when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice custom in
the pursuit of other and larger ends."'45
Judge Ruffin cast his decision and its outcome as being under the
"established habits and uniform practice of the country,"46 but he and
society would have been better served had he adhered to a different
judicial philosophy:
It is the function of our courts to keep the doctrines up to date
with the mores by continual restatement and by giving them a
continually new content. This is judicial legislation, and the
judge legislates at his peril. Nevertheless, it is the necessity and
duty of such legislation that gives to judicial office its highest
42.

CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE HUMANE IMAGINATION 6 (1986).

43. Andrew Fede, Legitimized Violent Slave Abuse in the American South, 1619-1865:
A Case Study of Law and Social Change in Six Southern States, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 93,

139 (1985).
44. See generally Commonwealth v. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678 (1827)
(Brockenbrough, J., dissenting) (dissenting from a case reaching the same result as Mann
and arguing that a master's interest in the full enjoyment of the right of property in the
slave would not be interfered with by reaching a different result, because cruel punishment
was not necessary for enjoyment of the slave as a thing, and that the master's security
interests, the peace of society, and slave subordination would all be served by
criminalizing the conduct of the defendant); Fede, supra note 43, at 141 (noting that, in
writing the Mann opinion, Ruffin deviated from the common law in North Carolina at the
time in order to reach the result that he wanted).
45.

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 65 (1921).

46. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263,265 (1829).
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honor; and no brave and honest judge shirks the duty or fears
the peril.47
Given his status as a slave owner himself, perhaps Judge Ruffin was
motivated by his own personal beliefs rather than being truly
compelled by the status of the law at that time.4 8 He unquestionably
knew that, for slavery to survive, "it needed the support of elaborate
human institutions, such as law."4 9 His resort to the "established
habits and uniform practice of the country"5 as a rationale or
justification for the outcome in Mann was later used-while he was
still on the court-as a reason for weakening its holding.5 1
CONCLUSION

If a judicial opinion is "designed to persuade the parties and the
world that the decision arrived at is just, that the evidence has been
weighed, that the rules of law have been justly applied, that the rules
of law themselves have been fairly determined,"52 then Judge Ruffin
likely achieved that end in the minds of his contemporaries in 1829.
If, however, judicial opinions-particularly those that interpret and
apply the common law, rather than statutory law-are a part of a
"[c]onstitutional doctrine [that] succeeds if it expresses what turn out

47. Arthur L. Corbin, The Offer of an Act for a Promise, 29 YALE L.J. 767, 771-72

(1920).

48.

See ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 119 (1975) ("In such cases, and in the

law of slavery[,] ... it is useful to ask whether we are not dealing with a different rhetorical
purpose: not the justification of the result and of the underlying principles, but the
justification of the judge.").
49. Alfred Brophy, Humanity, Utility, and Logic in Southern Legal Thought: Harriet
Beecher Stowe's Vision in Dred: A Tale of the GreatDismal Swamp, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1113,
1124 (1998).
50. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 265.
51. See State v. Cesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 391, 409 (1849) ("1 am told, that policy and

necessity require that a different rule [than the common law] should exist in the case of a
slave. Necessity is the tyrant's plea, and policy never yet strip[ped], successfully, the
bandage from the eyes of Justice."). In the opinion, from which Chief Justice Ruffin

dissented, Judge Gaston went on to state:
I fully admit, that the degraded state of our slaves requires laws different from

those applicable to white men, but I see no authority in the courts of justice to
make the alteration. The evil is not one which calls upon the Court to abandon

their appropriate duty, that of enforcing the law as they find it. The legislature,
and only the legislature, can alter the law. It is not likely, however, that they will
undertake the task, difficult as it is admitted to be, while they find the courts of

justice willing to take from them the responsibility of providing for the evil.
Id. at 409-10.
52. COVER, supra note 48, at 119.
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to be at last the authentic impulses of the nation,"53 then Judge Ruffin
unquestionably failed. Judge Ruffin elevated his own personal belief
that slavery was an acceptable institution and part of American life
over his realization that the institution could not survive under
American law due to the multiple inconsistencies it would engender.
In State v. Mann, he made the judicial choice to maintain the legal
fiction of slaves as mere property, with no will or rights of their own,
in order to sustain slavery as a whole.

53. See BLACK, supra note 42, at 6.
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APPENDIX

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
Chowan County
V.

13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829)
JOHN MANN,
Defendant
WYNN, J., dissentiente.
Because the precedent law of this Court most assuredly holds
that a battery committed on a slave, with no excuse or justification, is
an indictable offense, see State v. Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582, 586
(1823), this Court should affirm the jury's conviction of Defendant
John Mann for the battery committed against the slave Lydia. I
therefore respectfully dissent.
I disagree with my esteemed colleagues that our existing laws in
North Carolina compel the result the majority opinion reaches in this
matter. As in Hale, "there is no positive law decisive of the question"
presented to us; as such, we should follow the example of our
respected Chief Justice and look for "a solution ... deduced from

general principles, from reasonings founded on the common law,
adapted to the existing condition and circumstances of our society,
and indicating that result which is best adapted to general
expedience." Id. at 582. Indeed, the common law in our State and
our Union is nascent, slowly building and developing with each
decision of the judiciary; in the absence of clear statutory directions
from the General Assembly as to how to decide a question of law, we
must be ever cognizant of the import and impact of each opinion we
issue-and ensure that we remain consistent and faithful to our past
analysis and holdings, as well as to our values as a society and young
nation. The predictability of the law and its outcomes are paramount
to the evolution of our State and country.
Thus, I remind my esteemed colleagues of the overriding
purpose of our criminal law: namely, to protect not only individual
citizens but also the fabric of our society as a whole. Our criminal
laws seek not to prevent any and all acts that menace the safety,
health, and welfare of the community. Assuredly, mere law would
never be sufficient for such protection, and we have rejected the
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degree of police powers that would be necessary for that type of
absolute security. Rather, our criminal laws are intended to deter
abhorrent behavior while also correcting or reforming the criminaland to remove him from contact with other, law-abiding citizens,
because we determine that such conduct will not be tolerated in our
society. It is for that reason that we refer to a criminal "paying his
debt to society," reflecting our common belief that a crime is a breach
of the social contract we hold with each other to behave in a certain
manner and above all to treat sentient beings with a certain humanity.
As noted by our respected Chief Justice in Hale,
the offence [of assault and battery] is injurious to the citizens at
large by its breach of the peace, by the terror and alarm it
excites, by the disturbance of that social order which it is the
primary object of the law to maintain, and by the contagious
example of crimes.
Id. at 584. Thus, acts of violence are committed against individuals,
yes, but are also considered to be crimes against the sovereignty of
our State and the collective values embodied and reflected in the laws
of our State-those that we have all decided as citizens that we hold
most dear.
I emphasize again the previous observations of this Court as to
the danger of allowing cruel and barbarous behavior to go
unpunished in our society, regardless of the identity of the victim of
such acts:
The common law has often been called into efficient operation
for the punishment of public cruelty inflicted upon animals, for
needless and wanton barbarity exercised even by masters upon
their slaves, and for various violations of decency, morals, and
comfort. Reason and analogy seem to require that a human
being, although the subject of property, should be so far
protected as the public might be injured through him.
Id. at 585. Moreover, our General Assembly has seen fit to restrict
the power of a master over his slave by criminalizing the killing of a
slave. See Act of 1817, ch. 949, 1819 N.C. Laws (Potter II) 1407; State
v. Tackett, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 210, 217 (1820). My colleague's majority
opinion would hold that anything less than the death of a slave
injured by his master-regardless of the cruel measures employed or
the absence of any provocation-would not be punishable under
criminal law. Thus, although the defendant sub judice shot an
unarmed slavewoman in the back as she sought to escape his
chastisement, he would not be held liable despite the foreseeability, if
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not likelihood, of her death resulting from such injury, even though a
jury of his peers found the circumstances to be such as to necessitate
punishment. I find this refusal to condemn such a brutal act, evincing
a callous disregard for human life, to be in complete opposition to the
common law and general mores of our time.
I concede the majority's point that "[t]he danger would be great,
indeed, if the tribunals of justice should be called on to graduate the
punishment appropriate to every temper and every dereliction of
menial duty." State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 267 (1829).
However, the case at bar requires us to make no such determinations,
nor need we issue any sweeping rule that a master may not punish his
own slave. We need merely to note that depraved indifference
toward human life-and cruel and deliberately barbarous actions that
reflect such an attitude-will not be tolerated in our society, and
certainly not by our courts and common law. The defendant here
employed a means of punishment-shooting an unarmed slavewoman
in the back-that far exceeded her offense of attempting to escape
chastisement. Such immoderate violence, so grossly disproportionate
to the provocation, was unnecessary and unwarranted. The mere
good fortune that the slave Lydia survived her wound, rather than die
from it, should not be the determinative factor in whether the
defendant is guilty of murder or innocent of any criminal offense.
Regardless of the victim or her health, his behavior remains contrary
to the decency and morals of our society. Accordingly, I would affirm
his criminal conviction.
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